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Abstract
Studying the member states' constitutional choice of European decision rules most power index
analyses concentrate on the relative decisiveness of member states in the Council of Minister.
However, this emphasis has two shortcomings: First, it ignores the interaction between the
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament which provides multi-cameral
decision making for European legislation. Second, although relative decisiveness is applied to the
measurement of the member states' (expected) distribution of legislative gains, it does not take into
account the member states' expectation of the extent of gains depending on their absolute
inclusiveness. In this article we present a model of member states' constitutional choice of
European decision rules with regard to the two notions of power: actors' relative decisiveness and
their absolute inclusiveness in decision making. We present an index to measure inclusiveness and
we apply our concept to European multi-cameral procedures. Hereby, we give an account for the
member states' recent reforms of legislative procedures.
Kurzfassung
Bei der Erklärung der institutionenpolitischen Wahl europäischer Gesetzgebungsverfahren stellen
die meisten spieltheoretischen Machtindex-Analysen den intergouvernementalen Ministerrat in den
Mittelpunkt. Diese Vereinfachung ist aus zweierlei Hinsicht unangemessen. Zum einen wird das
interinstitutionelle Zusammenspiel zwischen der Kommission, dem Ministerrat und dem
Europäischen Parlament vernachlässigt, welches die europäischen Gesetzgebungsverfahren als
Mehrkammerverfahren definiert. Zum anderen reflektieren die relativen Durchsetzungspotentiale
der Gesetzgebungsakteure lediglich die (erwartete) Verteilung legislativer Gewinne. Dagegen wird
die Frage nach der Höhe der Gewinne ausgeblendet, welche von den Chancen der Akteure abhängt,
daß ihre individuellen Vorstellungen in Entscheidungen berücksichtigt werden. Diese absolute
Macht bezeichnen wir aus akteursspezifischer Sicht als Inklusivität. Im diesem Beitrag stellen wir
ein Modell der konstitutionellen Wahl europäischer Gesetzgebungsverfahren vor, welches beide
Machtaspekte formaler Entscheidungsvorgaben berücksichtigt: das relative Durchsetzungspotential
und die absolute Inklusivität der Akteure. Wir führen einen Index zur Messung der Inklusivität ein
und wenden unserer Konzept auf die europäischen Mehrkammerverfahren an. Schließlich
beleuchten wir vergangene Reformen der europäischen Gesetzgebungsverfahren. 
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1. Explaining the Constitutional Change of European Decision
Rules
Constitutional events have recently changed the procedural settings for European (EU) cooperation.
Since the mid 1980s, treaty reforms like the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty in
1993 and the accession of Portugal and Spain (1986) and of Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995)
have brought about continued modification to EU decision rules. Two basic approaches are used to
analyze institutional change of EU decision rules: the intergovernmental power index and the spatial
model approach. The intergovernmental power index approach concentrates on the impact of
accessions by analyzing the distribution of voting weights in the Council of Ministers. When
questioning the setting-up of voting weights, voting power studies are primarily concerned with the
constitutional choice of rules which is within the competence of the member states' governments.
The spatial model approach focuses on the strategic interaction between the Commission, the
Council and - in some cases - the European Parliament (EP). Analyzing the procedural settings of
European decision making, spatial models focus on the choice within rules. In this paper we argue
that both fail to give a satisfactory account for the complexity of the EU institutional framework.
Intergovernmental power index analyses suggest that the configuration of member states' voting
weights in the Council of Ministers express the institutional situation in the expanding community
(Brams/Affuso 1985, Hosli 1993, Johnston 1995, Widgrén 1994, Lane et al. 1995). Power index
studies often apply a variety of indices to measure the impact of alternative settings on member
states' relative decisiveness. An important shortcoming of these voting power studies is that they only
refer to one property of decision rules, namely the relative difference between actors. If some actors
are privileged with higher voting weights or individual veto rights, the relative voting power concept
calculates their difference by their relative abilities of being decisive in forming winning coalitions.
Yet, relative voting power studies do not pay attention to the distinction between strong and weak
decision rules: In the case of one-by-one voting, simple majority, qualified majority and unanimity
rules result in equal voting power shares for all decisive actors. However, weak majority rules
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the consent of all actors (Buchanan/Tullock 1962, Coleman 1971). Since majority rules as well as
unanimity rule apply to EU legislation the question is why member states facilitate the passing of EU
legislation in some policy areas and not in others. The intergovernmental approach on relative
decisiveness is therefore not able to provide an account to this question.
The spatial model approach calls the utility of power index analysis of the Council of Ministers
fundamentally into question. One argument is that intergovernmental power index studies ignore the
strategic interaction between the Council, the Commission and the EP in the passage of EU
legislation when they focus on the relative power distribution between member states
(Garrett/Tsebelis 1996). Except for Article 148,2b, all EU legislative procedures require a
Commission proposal that must be adopted by the member states with unanimity, simple or qualified
majority. Under the terms of cooperation procedure (Article 189c) the EP is a conditional agenda
setter (Tsebelis 1994). Under codecision procedure (Article 189b) the EP has blocking power
(Steunenberg 1994, Schneider 1995), thereby altering the strategic setting. Spatial models illustrate
the policy implications of strong and weak decision rules by referring to EU inter-institutional win
sets, but voting power analyses report similar findings derived from inter-institutional win sets
(König 1995, Laruelle/Widgrén 1997).
Another argument for spatial analysis and against voting power studies is that the latter do not take
into account the preference of actors (Garrett/Tsebelis 1997: 11). Theoretically, it is difficult to
compare both approaches because they not only address to different questions but they also use
different assumptions. While voting power studies mostly rely on simple games distinguishing
between (equiprobable) Yes- and No-votes, spatial models assume actors to have distinct
preferences. However, claiming that preferences are important variables is not the same as proposing
that they are the most important ones. From an empirical point of view, it should be possible to find
instances where voting power indices work well and others where spatial models perform better. Like
relative voting power studies we are concerned with the constitutional choice of rules and,
accordingly, we start with the concept of simple games in order to propose an alternative index. This
index provides additional insight into the constitutional choice of rules taking into account the
strength of rules. 
In this paper, we hope to close this gap by presenting a model of member states' constitutional
choice. First, we will try to clarify the distinction between both approaches. We introduce our
concept of inclusiveness which generalizes the argument on policy consequences with regard to the
choice of decision rules. Whereas decisiveness expresses an actor's relative ability to be decisive on
any legislative proposal, the strength of decision rules determines an actor's absolute chances of
being incorporated in any collective decision. Since majority rules jeopardize the potential inclusion
of an actor's policy preferences, the crucial question is whether a member state accepts the possibility
of being in a minority position in future EU legislation.
Second, we argue that the combination of both relative decisiveness and absolute inclusiveness gives
an insight into member states' choice of EU institutional rules. Relative decisiveness is understood as
reflecting the actors' chances of determining the legislative outcome. As a result, member states
provide themselves with shares of votes to get a distribution of legislative gains they have agreed
upon. Inclusiveness, however, refers to the extent of EU legislative gains dependent on the strength
of the decision rule. Both concepts are related to the member states' expectations of EU legislative
gains, determining their constitutional choice of unanimity, qualified majority, simple majority, or
single veto players for specific policy areas.
Third, according to spatial model approaches, any measurement of legislative gains must take into
account the EU inter-institutional coalition problem between the Commission, the Council, and the
EP. The problem of inter-institutional coalition building is defined on EU procedural settings: the
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the Commission and the Council, we can distinguish between policy areas with expected low gains
and those promising higher profits by asymmetric distribution. Compared to standard bicameralism,
the blocking minority rule of Article 148,2b, the only unicameral procedure without a Commission
proposal, redistributes the shares between large and small member states. The semi-tricameral
cooperation procedure raises the chances of parliamentary actors being included in coalition building,
while at the same time providing them with few shares to influence the legislative outcome. The
same holds true for the codecision procedure when the member states have higher capacity to
determine the outcome.
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. In section 2 we present our concept of
acting entities and the inter-institutional set of winning coalitions. Thereafter, we introduce the
indices on relative power and on absolute inclusiveness. Finally, we apply both measures on current
EU legislative sets of winning coalitions.
2
2. Acting Entities and Inter-Institutional Sets of Winning
Coalitions
The concept of legislative winning coalitions makes up the foundations of the game-theoretical
measurement of legislative entities' decisiveness and inclusiveness. Both measures presuppose the
identification of relevant actors and their procedural interaction, whereas spatial models try to
identify the set of likely policy outcomes depending on the knowledge of actors’ preferences and
procedural interaction. In the past, however, parsimonious approaches to EU winning coalitions
trivialized EU procedural settings by ignoring inter-institutional interaction, assuming a unitary
(parliamentary) actor, or disregarding unequal settings of different shares of votes. Besides putting an
end to such parsimony we intend to improve the reliability of our model by explaining in some detail
our concept of EU actors and EU procedural interaction.
In game-theoretical analyses, actors are simply defined as entities making choices in a specific
context. This definition first presumes the identification of the acting entities and then considers the
qualification of goal specificity, independence and consistence for their actions. In the field of power
index analysis the primary task of actually identifying the relevant legislative entities is a well-known
problem. "Paradoxes" like the paradox of quarreling members, of new members and of size (Brams
1975) or the paradox of redistribution (Fischer/Schotter 1978) illustrate some of the crucial effects on
relative decisiveness when either the set of entities, or the entities themselves, are modified. In
international relation theory the unitary actor assumption on state behavior is an illustrative example
for the identification problem of acting entities (Achen 1995).
To avoid identification problems we begin our analysis by distinguishing between three types of
legislative entities: individuals (natural persons), corporate actors (organizations with delegates as
their agents), and collective actors (voting bodies). Like a natural person, a corporate actor is often
considered to be a unitary entity having well-behaved preferences over outcomes and acting on
purpose. Hence, there is no difference between individual and corporate actors if we ignore the
controlling problem of delegates. In contrast to individual and corporate actors, collective actors are
analysed as aggregates of individuals and/or corporate actors. The aggregation problem of individual
and/or corporate actors is the topic of social choice theory, showing the unitary actor assumption on
collective actors to rarely apply in cases of two or more dimensions (McKelvey 1979, Koehler 1990).
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bodies aggregating different sets of legislative entities. The Commission prepares proposals on which
most of EU legislative decisions are based. In principle, the Commission is a college of twenty
Commissioners each responsible for his or her General Directorate. Each Commissioner is provided
with his or her own portfolio, carries the main leadership responsibility, and is independent of the
Commission President in determining how to act on EU legislative decisions. We therefore
conceptualize the Commission as a unitary actor in EU legislation with the responsible
Commissioner as its agent (see also Spence 1994, Westlake 1994).
In the Council, the governments of the member states are represented by delegates mediating
between their own governments and those of other delegates (Johnston 1994). National governments
instruct their delegates, who then cast their votes homogeneously in the Council. Since we ignore the
controlling problem of delegation, we conceptualize the national delegate as an entity voting for its
member state. Regarding the member states' votes we can distinguish between equal and unequal
settings. In the case of the EU qualified majority rule with 71,2% threshold, voting weights differ
between large and smaller member states, thus providing for unequal settings. Against this, equal
settings are provided for by the simple majority criterion and unanimity where member states are
counted one-by-one. Member states' votes are then aggregated in the Council, a collective actor
facing other voting bodies in the course of EU legislative decision making.
Although the EP is seldom involved in EU legislative decision making, the disaggregation of the EP's
entities causes further conceptual difficulties. Apart from different combinations of formal
institutional settings, parliamentary systems differ in terms of specific peculiarities characteristic of a
particular legislature. A specific characteristic of the EP is the affiliation of parliamentary
representatives to both political groups and national groups. The fact that the vote of EP
representatives on national group affiliation is merely a repetition of the intergovernmental coalition
problem in the Council, means that it is the political group affiliation that points out the unique
contribution of parliamentary participation in EU legislation. We model political groups therefore as
EP entities with votes weighted according to their party representatives on the grounds that party
cleavage is observed to dominate over national cleavage in the formation of majority coalitions
(Jacobs et al. 1992, Attina 1990). Since no political group has an absolute majority at its disposal,
political group votes are, by necessity, aggregated in the EP when it participates in EU legislation.
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Apart from the concept of legislative entities, the procedural settings of EU legislation also define
inter-institutional sets of winning coalitions, consisting of all entities necessary to adopt a proposal.
However, identifying EU legislative sets of winning coalitions is made rather complicated for two
reasons: First, the Council's and the EP's decision rules vary, and second, the role of the Commission
is rather speculative. According to Article 155, the Commission holds the exclusive right to initiate
legislation and the right to modify a proposal at any point of procedure (Article 189a,2), thereby
making the Commission the agenda setter. Moreover, the Commission also has the right to withdraw,
if the proposal’s object is felt to emasculated by amendments (Usher 1994). The Commission cannot,
therefore, be excluded from the set of all relevant legislative entities (for a counterargument, see
Tsebelis/Garrett 1996). Although we use constitutional provisions for defining the inter-institutional
linkage we often have to make further decisions on the role of voting bodies.
The varying decision rules in the Council and the EP reveal different levels of EU legislation which,
taken together, can be conceptualized as a legislative game. We can distinguish between three levels:
the basic game, the subgame, and the compound game. The basic game level refers to the prime
entities such as individuals or national party delegations which have to form the political groups in
4 of 12 04.12.97 11:22
EIoP: Text 1997-022: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-022.htmthe EP. On the subgame level, the internal coalition problem between either the member states in the
Council or the parliamentary political groups in the EP has to be solved. To be more specific, except
for constitutional unanimity, the Council subgame offers two voting criteria, since, even in the case
of majority voting, amendments always require unanimity among member states. Under the
cooperation and codecision procedures, the EP may take action or no action. Preventing endorsement
by no action slightly decreases the majority criterion, since the EP has always been a voting body
consisting of an equal number of representatives. Finally, the compound game requires
inter-institutional consent between the Commission, the Council and - in some cases - the EP.
EU legislative sets of winning coalitions require consent among all relevant voting bodies and thus
depend on the solution of the coalition problems at the subgame level. The set of winning coalitions
of the standard procedure requires the consent of the Commission and of the Council referring to
unanimity, simple or qualified majority subgames of member states. As the cooperation procedure
includes the EP in EU legislation, an additional legislative set of winning coalitions is introduced: the
first set encompasses the Commission and the unanimous member states, the second consists of the
Commission, more than 62 Council votes and at least half of the parliamentary votes. The latter set
of winning coalitions is also feasible under codecision procedure, but here the additional set
combines the unanimous member states with at least the absolute majority of parliamentary votes.
Hence, under codecision procedure the EP holds the position of the Commission under cooperation
procedure. In this respect, both combinations of two sets of winning coalitions install a
semi-tricameral system: either the EP or the Commission can be excluded from EU legislation.
Legislative sets of winning coalitions represent the cornerstone of our analysis of the EU legislative
entities' decisiveness and inclusiveness. With regard to the fact that the member states establish
different legislative sets by introducing different procedures for EU policy areas, we investigate the
reasons for member states making the choices for specific institutional settings as they do. We take
into account the findings of spatial models on the importance of actors’ policy preferences by means
of our inclusiveness index. In addition, we apply the relative decisiveness concept to the
inter-institutional sets of winning coalitions in EU legislation. In the following section we argue that
member states take into account the effects on both their decisiveness and inclusiveness when they
introduce or change the procedural settings for EU policy areas.
3. Decisiveness and Inclusiveness in European Legislation
The bicameral setting of the standard procedure between the Commission and the Council and the
semi-tricameral participation of the EP under cooperation and of the Commission under codecision
procedure suggest that member states try to reach different goals by Treaty reforms, such as reducing
EU transaction costs or decreasing the so-called democratic deficit (see Wessels 1991, Ludlow
1991). In the past, the Commission was given functions of legislative agenda setting and
safeguarding, and the EP was given rights in EU legislation. However, since the member states are
the signatories of the EU constitution, their expected gains are the driving force behind the material
integration of policy domains and the constitutional choice of different procedures. Thus by focusing
solely on the impact on qualified majority rule in the Council, many intergovernmental analyses are
unable to explain the reasons for institutional delegation.
4
This shortcoming is best illustrated by some of the partly striking, then again partly insufficient
conclusions drawn by such analyses. The most prominent result was the discovery of the "dummy
player-position" of Luxembourg having no relative power during the first EU Treaty era under
qualified majority rule (Brams 1976). Second to this, Council power index analysis recently claimed
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increase from 23 to 26 minimum votes reduces the British power share (Johnston 1995). Others
argue that, due to the accession of new members, the relative decisiveness differences between
unanimity and majority decision rules become less and less pronounced (Lane et al. 1995). Such
striking results of Council power index studies prompt the question of whether the relative power
among the member states is sufficiently able to explain the intergovernmental choice of EU decision
rules (Garret et al. 1995).
Indices on relative decisiveness are calculated using the concept of simple games with two
properties: first, simple games differentiate between winning and losing coalitions; and, second, they
satisfy monotonicity assuming the continuance of a winning coalition in cases of additional
members. In the case of simple games, indices of relative decisiveness are single valued solution
concepts on pivotal entities. Being pivotal is a relative resource referring to the entities' probability of
realizing their preference in the collective outcome. With this in mind, the simple demand made of
constitutional politics is to provide for either equal or unequal legislative entities.
We argue that the constitutional choice of EU voting rules depends on the expected gains from
potential legislation rather than the representative size of the member states' population, which may
only serve as a parameter. Accordingly, the unification of Germany had no effect on the distribution
of voting weights. Rather, the signatories' central motive was to improve the expected gains from
future cooperation based on their expected profits minus their expected costs of potential EU
legislation. Signatories decrease the threshold when all incumbents expect higher gains from future
majority legislation. If member states expect to be affected similarly by future legislation in EU
policy areas, equal settings will provide for a symmetrical distribution of expected gains. In contrast,
unequal settings can balance an expected asymmetric distribution of EU legislative gains among the
member states. 
The expectation of unfavorable distributions of legislative benefits raises the question of how to
balance potential EU legislative gains. Voting weights, minority blocking rules, veto player positions
or multi-cameralism with different subgames are all methods of establishing unequal settings for
legislative entities. Despite their procedural variety, all these methods may differentiate between the
entities' relative ability of being decisive on any EU legislative proposal. Relative power index
analysis is widely used, but an application on EU inter-institutional sets of winning coalitions makes
severe demands on the method of measurement. Compared to unicameral analysis, the normalization
over all entities must appropriately reflect the conditions for the different levels, the basic games, the
subgames and the inter-institutional compound game (König/Bräuninger 1996). Taking this into
consideration, the most applicable concepts for the analysis of the relative decisiveness of entities in
inter-institutional sets of winning coalitions are arguably the normalized Banzhaf and the
Shapley-Shubik index (Nurmi 1987).
Although both indices have certain theoretical parallels, they differ with respect to their conceptions
of critical defections. An entity's relative contribution to transforming a winning into a losing
coalition determines the relative Banzhaf power (Banzhaf 1965). Since the Banzhaf index takes into
account several critical positions in one single winning coalition, the additivity of critical positions
has to be called into question, in particular for inter-institutional sets of winning coalition
(Dubey/Shapley 1979). To tackle this, the normalized index refers to an entity's probability of being
critical in relation to the number of all critical defections. As a result, highly vulnerable minimal
winning coalitions become more important for the power calculation than those that are only made
vulnerable by a few members. Consequently, different membership sizes of subgames may already
distort the inter-institutional relationship of Banzhaf decisiveness (Shelley 1986). 
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The Shapley-Shubik index refers to all possible voting sequences and checks how often each entity is
able to transform a losing into a winning coalition (Shapley/Shubik 1954). An entity's decisiveness is
defined as the probability of being pivotal, i.e. decisive in one of all equal probable voting sequences.
Based on this concept, the individual Shapley-Shubik shares, fi, may be summed up for each
subgame and compared on the level of the compound game. Since almost all EU legislation is
adopted under multi-cameral procedures, we apply the Shapley-Shubik index to measure individual
decisiveness.
We regard the relative decisiveness as being a major aspect of the signatories' constitutional choice.
Similarly, we consider the signatories' choice of the strength of a decision-making rule as being the
second major aspect of EU institutional integration because it influences the likely policy outcomes
that will ensue. Weak decision rules, like simple majority, increase the likelihood of policy outcomes
offering the exclusion of entities from the EU legislative set of winning coalitions, whereas the
strongest decision rule of unanimity guarantees the inclusion of all actors, resulting in a strong status
quo bias of single favorable winning coalitions. Here, the member states' choice of the lowest
common denominator is based on the expected low extent of EU legislative gains, resulting from an
expectation of either low profits or high costs of potential EU legislation. Member states only expose
themselves to the danger of exclusion if they expect higher profits from potential EU legislation,
whereas a member state prefers unanimity in cases of expected low legislative gains.
The strength of a decision rule refers to the entities' chances of being included in any potential
collective decision. Since the member states bargain on potential legislation, we assume Yes- and
No-votes to have the same probability and, therefore, all feasible coalitions to be equiprobable. In a
simple game the probability of an entity's inclusion varies between 0.5 and 1.0. Strong decision rules
guarantee the inclusion of an entity's preferences in the collective decision, whereas a dummy
player's probability of being included is still 0.5. 
Assuming v to be a simple game, where v(S)=1 if S is winning, we define the inclusiveness index w
of actor i in the game v as
,
i.e. i's number of participations in winning coalitions in relation to the number of all feasible winning
coalitions (Bräuninger 1996). However, neither the relative nor the absolute aspect of expected
legislative gains solely explain the choice of decision rules. We argue that institutional settings are
instruments that can be used to obtain similar legislative gains for member states. Regarding the
extent of expected legislative gains, majority rules and unanimity are instruments used in the case of
equal settings, whereas the degree of inequality varies by voting weights or single veto player
positions. Thus, only the combination of both aspects, the (in-)equality and the strength, offers a
satisfactory account for the member states' choice of EU decision rules.
Figure 1
Figure 1 combines the instruments measured by relative decisiveness f and absolute inclusiveness w
of member states. For the explanation of specific constitutional choices, we take into account the two
aspects of member states' expectations of potential EU legislation, namely the expectation of the
extent and the distribution of potential EU legislative gains. As mentioned above, the expected extent
of legislative gains determines the choice of the strength of decision rules, but the expected
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symmetric distribution of EU legislative gains favors the setting of unanimity, whereas a higher
extent by symmetric distribution results in unweighted majority voting. Member states may also
agree on single veto player positions when they expect a low extent but an asymmetric distribution of
EU legislative gains. Finally, weighted votes may be introduced in the case of a high expected extent
by asymmetric distribution.
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Although our scheme pays sufficient attention to the member states' expectations of potential EU
legislation, the question of the participation of supranational entities such as the Commission and the
EP still remains. Introducing the factor of interaction between the Council, the Commission and the
EP, spatial models assume extreme policy positions of supranational entities when they determine the
different procedural win sets. Under this assumption, the participation of the Commission and the EP
decreases the potential for policy change in EU legislation, prompting the question as to why member
states should accept the restriction of their own legislative capacity. Leaving aside the assumption of
extreme policy positions of supranational entities, we argue that the Commission and the EP may
increase the expected profits of the member states by promising to reduce transaction costs and
criticism of the democratic deficit. Since different procedures exist for EU legislation, the application
of decisiveness and inclusiveness provides an insight into the member states' expectations of
different policy areas.
4. Member States' Expectations of Policy Area Legislation
The consequences of different provisions for the Commission, the member states and the political
groups in the EP are listed in Table 1. For the reasons discussed we measure relative decisiveness by
means of the Shapley-Shubik index f and absolute inclusiveness by means of our index w defined
above. In the rows of Table 1 we list the entities grouped along EU chambers. The columns refer to
four procedures and three different rules which may be applied to the standard procedure. Each of the
six procedural settings has distinct effects on the entities’ decisiveness and inclusiveness.
Table 1
Under standard procedure, we find equal and unequal settings with varying thresholds. Decisiveness
f does not differentiate between the member states either in the case of unanimity or simple majority,
but their inclusiveness w reveals the highest difference. Unanimity guarantees the inclusion of all
member states' policy preferences indicated by their maximal inclusiveness of 1.0. In the case of
simple majority, however, the danger of being excluded is very high and the entities' absolute
inclusiveness w approaches the dummy player's inclusion probability of 0.5. Under qualified majority
in standard, Article 148,2b, cooperation and codecision procedure the inclusion probability w of the
four large member states is 86% and 85% respectively, while Luxembourg's inclusiveness w varies
between 57% and 61%. The relative decisiveness of large member states is also higher here than in
cases of equal settings. Qualified majority thus stresses the differences between the member states
with regard to relative decisiveness and absolute inclusiveness.
Concerning the inter-institutional interaction in the standard procedure, the EP is a dummy player
and can be excluded from building any feasible winning coalition. Hence, its policy preference are
included only by luck. The feature of the bicameral setting is illustrated by the Commission’s
inclusiveness w and decisiveness f. Under standard procedure the Commission’s policy preference
must be included in any legislative proposal, but its ability of being decisive varies widely. The
Commission is an equal counterpart to all member states in cases of simple majority voting, but its
8 of 12 04.12.97 11:22
EIoP: Text 1997-022: Full text http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-022.htmdecisiveness f decreases from majority voting to unanimity. Hence, if the member states take a
unanimous decision, the Commission has the lowest share of relative power. Qualified majority
discriminates between the member states, and the additional provision for a minority rule (Article
148,2b) - the only unicameral procedure - not only favors the smaller member states’ relative
decisiveness f but also increases their absolute inclusiveness w. Except for the unicameral procedure
of Article 148,2b, the Commission's policy preferences are included in all EU legislation.
Compared to qualified majority under standard procedure, the cooperation and codecision procedures
have little effect on member states' inclusiveness w. Only their decisiveness f is modified as a result
of the participation of the EP. However, the parliamentary entities' probability of being included in
potential EU legislation increases substantially. Introducing the EP as a third collective actor is thus
an instrument geared towards involving the socio-economic cleavage in EU legislation without
increasing the member states' probability of having their preferences disregarded. Comparing the
cooperation and the codecision procedure, the latter strengthens the decisive role of the Council in
particular.
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Finally, our combination of relative decisiveness f and absolute inclusiveness w gives a satisfactory
account for the member states' choice of institutional settings when they expect legislative gains from
potential EU legislation. Although the participation of supranational entities, such as the Commission
or the EP, may promise higher gains, the member states' expectation of potential EU legislative costs
prohibits the material integration of further policy areas. Material integration is thus a function of the
expected effects of institutional settings.
Table 2
A first indicator for the importance of procedural settings is their selective application to EU policy
areas. EU decision rules not only vary in the degree of inclusiveness and decisiveness. Moreover, the
provisions for EU legislation have been changed quite differently and discriminate even within
policy areas. Table 2 lists the proportion of procedural settings for all EU policy areas introduced by
the original Treaty in 1958, the Single European Act in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
Besides the areas of association, institutional and final provisions, agricultural and trade policies are
excepted from constitutional modifications. The latter are dominated by the provision of qualified
majority rules under standard procedure. According to our two aspects of constitutional choice,
member states always expected an asymmetric distribution of high amounts of EU legislative gains
that are increased by the Commission’s role in reducing transaction costs. For agricultural and trade
policies, both characterized by the highest number of (adopted) EU proposals (König 1996), member
states have abstained from reducing of the democratic deficit by excluding the EP.
In comparison, many modifications have been made in the areas of free movement, traffic, common
rules and social policy which encompass the participation of the EP. The introduction of the
cooperation procedure has also contributed to the reduction of the proportion of qualified and
unanimous provisions. We observe a similar pattern for the introduction of the codecision procedure.
Except for environmental policies, the codecision procedure has replaced the former provision for the
cooperation procedure. Again, the recent introduction of industry policy does not promise high EU
legislative gains which paves the way for weaker decision rules, whereas other areas introduced by
the Maastricht Treaty provide for qualified majorities. In sum, different procedures and different
decision rules regulate most EU policy areas. Our findings show a tendency towards weighted
qualified majority voting in the Council either by modifications to the standard procedure or by the
introduction of the cooperation and codecision procedures. Despite this overall tendency, the member
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Looking beyond the scope of the analysis here, the Maastricht Treaty has brought about a new pattern
of EU institutional integration. This new form of integration describes the move to selective
expectations of potential legislative costs. It can be observed in the recent trend of including
provisions for „opt-out“ clauses as often favored by either the United Kingdom or Denmark. The
tendency towards this new pattern of selective EU integration has been reinforced in the provisions
laid down for Monetary Union, as illustrated by the current debate on the economic criteria for
membership.
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Relative Decisiveness (Shapley-Shubik fi) and Absolute Inclusiveness
(wi) of EU Legislative Actors (August 1995)
Vote Standard Procedure Article 148,2b Cooperation Codecision
Unanimity Simple Maj.  Qualified Maj.
fi  wi  fi  wi  fi  wi  fi  wi  fi  wi  fi  wi 
Commission  1  .0625 1.0000 .5000 1.0000 .3103 1.0000 0  .5000 .2841 1.0000 .2216 .9996
C 
o 
u 
n 
c 
i 
l
France  10  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0810 .8627  .1114  .8490 .0674 .8627  .0709 .8627
Germany  10  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0810 .8627  .1114  .8490 .0674 .8627  .0709 .8627
Italy  10  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0810 .8627  .1114  .8490 .0674 .8627  .0709 .8627
U.K.  10  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0810 .8627  .1114  .8490 .0674 .8627  .0709 .8627
Spain  8  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0662 .8003  .0920  .7939 .0552 .8004  .0587 .8004
Belgium  5  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0377 .6909  .0563  .7098 .0312 .6910  .0347 .6910
Greece  5  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0377 .6909  .0563  .7098 .0312 .6910  .0347 .6910
Netherlands  5  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0377 .6909  .0563  .7098 .0312 .6910  .0347 .6910
Portugal  5  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0377 .6909  .0563  .7098 .0312 .6910  .0347 .6910
Austria  4  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0310 .6556  .0476  .6798 .0258 .6557  .0293 .6557
Sweden  4  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0310 .6556  .0476  .6798 .0258 .6557  .0293 .6557
Denmark  3  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0242 .6167  .0389  .6486 .0204 .6169  .0239 .6169
Ireland  3  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0242 .6167  .0389  .6486 .0204 .6169  .0239 .6169
Finland  3  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0242 .6167  .0389  .6486 .0204 .6169  .0239 .6169
Luxembourg  2  .0625 1.0000 .0333 .5500  .0141 .5736  .0251  .6069 .0120 .5737  .0155 .5737
Sum of Council  87  .9375 –  .5000 –  .6897 –  1.0000 –  .5744 –  .6269 – 
EP Socialists  221 0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0551 .8450  .0596 .8453
European
People's Party
172 0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0327 .6529  .0362 .6530
United Left  31  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0070 .5552  .0073 .5552
Liberal Dem.
and
Reformists 
52  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0126 .6017  .0132 .6018
Democratic
Alliance 
56  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0140 .6137  .0146 .6137
Radical
Alliance 
19  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0040 .5338  .0042 .5338
Greens  25  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0056 .5469  .0058 .5470
Europe of
Nations 
19  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0040 .5338  .0042 .5338
FPÖ (NI)  5  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0010 .5100  .0010 .5100
Vlaams Blok
(NI)  2  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0003 .5033  .0003 .5033
Front
National
1  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0002 .5017  .0002 .5017
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Front
National
France (NI) 
11  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0024 .5212  .0025 .5212
Democratic
Unionist (NI)
1  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0002 .5017  .0002 .5017
Alleanza
Nazionale.
(NI) 
11  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000  0  .5000 .0024 .5212  .0025 .5212
Sum of EP  626 0  –  0  –  0  –  0  –  .1415 –  .1515 – 
NI – Non-attached members
Table II
Proportion of Procedural Settings by Treaty Eras
EEC Treaty 
(1958-1987)
Single European Act 
(1987-1993) 
Maastricht Treaty 
(1993-)
EU Policy Areas  U  Q  S  U  Q  S  CO  U  Q  S  CO  CD 
Principles/Citizenship  60  40    43  43    14  67  22      11 
Free Movement of Goods  22  78    12  88      12  88       
Agriculture  17  83    17  83      17  83       
Free Movement of Ps., Serv., Cap.  47  53    33  39    28  33  43      24 
Transport  67  33    50  50      50  17    33   
Common Rules  43  57    30  50    20  31  54      15 
Economic Policy  20  80    20  80      17  58    25   
Trade    100      100        100       
Social Policy  40  40  20  33  33  17  17  25      50  25 
Culture                        100 
Public Health                        100 
Consumer Protection                        100 
Transeuropean Networks                      50  50 
Industry                100         
Economic and Social Cohesion        25  50    25  40  20    40   
Research and Technical Develop.        50      50  25  25    25  25 
Environment        100        33      33  33 
Development                      100   
Association  100      100        100         
Institutional Provisions  100      100        100         
Financial Provisions  50  50    45  55      33  67       
Final Provisions  80  20    80  20      80  20       
Sum per Era (100%)  51  48  1  45  45  1  9  38  38    12  11 
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Source: Compilation of own data, see König (1997).
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